New Mexico’s Dry Middle Rio Grande: More Data Visualizations

Graph showing days of river drying on New Mexico's middle Rio Grande, showing 2025 the driest since the 1970s.

25 cfs at Central means the Rio Grande dries before it reaches the Albuquerque wastewater treatment plant.

Alert Inkstain reader Rolf asked in the comments of last weekend’s post for a version of the above graph – number of days of low flow at the Central Avenue Bridge – with a threshold above zero. I usually set the threshold at 25, because our experience in the last two drying episodes – 2022 and 2025 – that’s the point at which the river went dry before it could reach the wastewater treatment plant.

Bar chart of annual Rio Grande flow at Otowi Bridge, NM, from early 1900s to 2025, measured in acre-feet through August 21 each year. Each vertical bar shows a year’s flow; 2025 is near the low end. Years with less flow than 2025 are highlighted in red, showing rare but repeated low-flow events, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Thick black horizontal bars mark decadal averages, which decline from the high flows of the early 20th century to lower averages in recent decades, illustrating a long-term downward trend.

Previous years this dry or drier, with added decadal horizontal bars.

Here’s an updated version of total flow past Otowi to date, with previous years this dry or drier in red, and I added horizontal bars to show decadal averages. As alert reader Devin pointed out, the years after 1972 include imported San Juan-Chama flows. Rio Grande Compact accounting would subtract that out (“Otowi Index Flow”), but I’m interested in the hydrologic reality in the valley, not in using this as an accounting or climate measure. This helps us think about how much water we actually have entering the valley.

Bar chart of annual Rio Grande flow at Albuquerque, NM, from the 1960s to 2025, measured in acre-feet through August 21 each year. Each bar shows a year’s flow; 2025 is highlighted near the low end. Years with less flow than 2025 are in red, showing such low-flow events have been uncommon but not unprecedented. Thick black horizontal bars mark decadal averages, which rise into the 1980s and then decline steadily through recent decades, illustrating a long-term reduction in average flow.

Total flow to date at Albuquerque gage.

Here’s the same approach as for Otowi above, but for Albuquerque. As measured by total flow to date, this is also the lowest since 1977.

And since it keeps showing up, here’s 1977. Worth noting (but hard to parse in too much detail because of some missing data) is that El Vado Reservoir began 1977 at near-normal levels, and even though it was a terrible snowpack year they were able to supplement flows by some 100,000 acre feet by draining El Vado between late April and early August of ’77 to supplement the Rio Grande’s flow:

Line and shaded-area chart of daily Rio Grande flows at Albuquerque, NM, 1965–2025. Shaded blue and green bands show historical ranges and medians. The 1977 line (black) shows lower-than-normal flows through winter and spring, but with sharp spikes during the summer monsoon. The 2025 line (blue) stays consistently low with no strong runoff or monsoon surge. The record median (green dashed) shows a strong May–June peak, absent in both 1977 and 2025.

1977: drier spring, wetter summer.

Driest on New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande since when? 1972? 1964?

Upturned couch in a dry, sandy riverbed, flanked by green trees on both side

Dry Rio Grande. Albuquerque, July 2025

I spent some time this morning crunching numbers, trying to make numerical sense of how bad this year is on New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande. We keep saying it’s only the second time the Rio Grande has dried through Albuquerque since the 1980s, but that felt insufficient.

Some data visualization experiments:

Graph of days of drying on the Rio Grande at Albuquerque's central avenue bridge, showing the most drying days since 1972.

Total days, by year, with a USGS average daily gage measurement of zero at Central Avenue in Albuquerque (forgive the “or less,” the code allows me to look at low flows below arbitrary thresholds)

By this measure – total days measured at “zero” by the USGS gage at Central Avenue in Albuquerque – it’s the driest since 1972, when the river was dry at that spot on 74 days. (Note that if it’s dry at Central, it’s already been dry far longer at points downstream.)

Or this: How much total water is entering New Mexico’s Middle Valley, as measured at Otowi, the gage immediately upstream? This uses some old code I wrote some time ago to sum up total flows to date at a gage, to allow year-to-year comparison during the year. I colored this year, and all previous years that were worse, in red. By this measure, 2025 is the driest year since 1964.

Graph of total flow through Aug. 15 at the USGS Otowi gage on the Rio Grande, with 2025 and all years previously lower colored red. This shows 2025 as the driest year since 1964.

Total flow to date past Otowi.

 

Awaiting the Colorado River 24-Month Study

By John Fleck, Anne Castle, Eric Kuhn, Jack Schmidt, Kathryn Sorensen, and Katherine Tara

As we await Friday’s (Aug. 15, 2025) release of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Colorado River 24-Month Study, we need to remember a painful lesson of the last five years of crisis management: whatever you see in Reclamation’s report of the “Most Probable” reservoir levels for the next two years, we must prepare for things to be much worse.

A year ago, Reclamation’s “Most Probable” forecast told us to expect Lake Powell to hold 10.36 million acre feet of water at the end of July 2025, with a surface elevation 3,593 feet above sea level. Actual storage in Powell at the end of July was 7.46 maf, 2.9 million acre feet less, and the reservoir is 38 feet lower, than the “Most Probable” forecast.

Four years ago, one of us (Eric Kuhn) wrote this, which is helpful in understanding what is happening:

The problem: the assumptions underlying the study do not fully capture the climate-change driven aridification of the Colorado River Basin.

In 2022, a Utah State Center for Colorado River Studies team led by Jian Wang (including one of us, Schmidt) took this on in more technical detail – Evaluating the Accuracy of Reclamation’s 24-Month Study of Lake Powell Projections. The finding provided technical support for an intuition water managers already had: the 24-Month Study has an optimistic bias.

It is a practical demonstration of the problem U.S. Geological Survey scientist Paul Milly and colleagues famously warned us about nearly two decades ago – in water management, climate change means the past is increasingly unhelpful in projecting the future.

The 24-Month Study: A Brief Primer

Produced monthly, Reclamation’s 24-Month Study includes three scenarios: Most Probable, Minimum Probable, and Maximum Probable. The Study includes 18 pages of data and forecasts for twelve Colorado River system reservoirs, from Fontenelle and Flaming Gorge in the north to Mohave and Havasu in the south, projecting things like elevation, storage, inflows, releases, evaporation, and hydropower production each month for the next two years.

Here is Wang et al’s explanation of how it works:

Projections for reservoir elevations during the next few months are based on predictions of reservoir inflow using a widely accepted watershed hydrologic model run by the Colorado Basin River Forecast Center. The input data for that model are observed snowpack in the watershed, soil moisture, and anticipated precipitation and temperature. Projections for reservoir elevations beyond the immediately proximate winter, a year or more in the future (‘second year projections’), are based on statistical probabilities calculated using analyses of past inflows during a 30-year reference period.

The resulting model runs represent a wide range of uncertainties, which are captured in three resulting scenarios:

  • Most Probable: the middle of the range
  • Maximum Probable: the 90th percentile scenario, meaning that 10% of the model runs predict even wetter hydrology and 90% predict drier.
  • Minimum Probable: the 10th percentile scenario, meaning that 10% of the model runs predict even drier hydrology and 90% predict wetter.

The problem, implicit in the argument Milly et al. made nearly two decades ago, is that a 30-year reference period is no longer a reliable indicator of what we should expect in the future. It represents a river we no longer have. This is not to suggest any bias or partiality on the part of Reclamation, but merely that the algorithms and modeling used to produce the 24-Month Study have proven in recent years to be skewed more toward the the past than the true-to-life. Our response needs to reflect that reality.

Because of the changing conditions in the Colorado River Basin, the Minimum Probable scenario has become the most valuable in providing a reliable indicator of the future. Actual flows and reservoir levels have been tracking the minimum probable forecast since March of this year. As we enter the fall of 2025, with the weak summer monsoon for most of the Upper Basin coupled with weak La Niña conditions persisting through the fall and early winter, and NOAA’s seasonal outlook pointing to a warmer and drier than average fall, it’s a good bet that this trend will continue at least through mid-winter. The Basin should be prepared for minimum probable conditions, with a clear possibility that  actual conditions could be worse than the 10th percentile scenario. The basin community needs to be ready to respond with the necessary water use reductions now to protect the Colorado River system on which we all depend.

Sources:

Glacial Erratics

Great blue heron on a large pyramid-shaped rock jutting out of calm waters with a low distant horizon of hills.

Great blue heron on a glacial erratic. Photo by L. Heineman, Aug. 2025

WHIDBEY ISLAND – It’s a five minute walk to the beach from the place we’re staying on Whidbey Island. It’s a pebbly beach, not like the soft sands of Oxnard where I first met (and in one case, fell in love with) the folks around me this week. Time has lifted and moved us, depositing us in very different places from where we were when our paths first crossed in the early 1980s.

The landscape here around the Salish Sea (“Puget Sound” is the name for the lobe extending south toward Seattle, and “Saratoga Passage” for the bit of water in the picture between Whidbey and Camano islands, each a subset nested in the larger) is fundamentally glacial, carved again and again, most recently some 15,000-ish years ago by the advance and retreat of what we moderns call the Puget Lobe of the Vashon Glacier. Thousands of feet thick, it bulldozed the landscape all higgledy-piggledy, shoving boulders and rocks and gavel and sand this way and that, then dumping them as the glacier dwindled away, melting and leaving great rolling hills of gentle topography hundreds of feet (thousands? I can only see the bits above the water line) thick.

Boulders in shallow water next to a rocky beach.

Glacial erratics, Whidbey Island, photo by John Fleck, August 2025

Down the beach on an early morning walk the day after our arrival, I was smitten by these big boulders. “Glacial erratics” is one of my favorite sciency terms. Rocks carried from one place by a glacier and deposited in another, they are storytellers, encoded with the place they came from and the place they ended up. These rocks came down from what we would today call “Canada”, though Stefan Freelan’s marvelous map shows how odd the categories created by human-drawn lines on the map are as related to the underlying landscape.

I picked up a rental bike and spent a good part of the day Saturday riding the island, which about killed my poor old guy legs. One of the joys of cycling is the visceral, physical feel you get for the landscape. This one has rollers, up and down and up and down and up and down – the glacial till is rarely flat. The joy was real, the feel for the landscape, but yowza my legs felt it the next day. Cycling the Rio Grande Valley has not left me well prepared for this style of riding. I had to figure out how to fit the bike in the rental car so I could drive to a flatter part of the island to ride.

White ferry boat with green trim approaching doc with piling in the foreground.

The Salish approaching Keystone on Whidbey Island. Photo by John Fleck

Off to the east, the Keystone Ferry runs back and forth to Port Townsend on the mainland, the Olympic Peninsula. Locals look at me oddly when I share my enthusiasm for the rhythm of ferry traffic, the coming together of a group of people to act collectively to get from one place to another. Bridges have a lot of the same conceptual characteristics, but less romance. I was happy to park the bike and sit on a picnic bench, resting the old man legs (I ask so much of them!) while watching a ferry named “Salish” dock and discharge its collective humanity. There was a teenager down on the beach tossing rocks into the air and then whacking them into the water with a stick.

I first started coming to the edge of the Salish Sea in the late ‘70s. I lived in Walla Walla, in eastern Washington, and we’d drive over Snoqualmie Pass to Seattle, often, to play the sort of games energetic youngsters experimenting with their emergence into adulthood play. We’ve been coming ever since – first to revisit my youth, then to visit members of my kooky chosen family who settled on the Island. It’s been a while since we last came, and it’s nice to be back.

The octagonal house on the beach at Snakelum Point that we visited in the ‘80s is gone, replaced by a hideous mansion built to the lot lines – we had to ignore the no trespassing signs to revisit the memories. It’s been replaced as a chosen family anchor in our lives by a menagerie up in the woods with its own sawmill, to mill the boards from which the new homestead has been built. That’s the joy, and the place the glacial erratic metaphor breaks down. The boulders just sit there, but at our best we human erratics make place.

138,000 cfs

A beach crowded with people enjoying a hot summer afternoon along a large river, with forested hills on the far bank.

Broughton Beach on the Columbia River at low tide, Portland Oregon, July 29, 2025.

But look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and seemingly bound for a dive. Strange! Nothing will content them but the extremest limit of the land; loitering under the shady lee of yonder warehouses will not suffice. No. They must get just as nigh the water as they possibly can without falling in. And there they stand—miles of them—leagues. Inlanders all, they come from lanes and alleys, streets and avenues—north, east, south, and west. Yet here they all unite.

Herman Melville, Moby Dick

Quoting Martha Nussbaum

And what if it is love one is trying to understand, that strange unmanageable phenomenon or form of life, source at once of illumination and confusion, agony and beauty? Love, in its many varieties, and their tangled relations to the good human life, to aspiration, to general social concern? What parts of oneself, what method, what writing, should one choose then? What is, in short, love’s knowledge—and what writing does it dictate in the heart?

Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature

Craig Allen joins us on the Utton Center’s Water Matters! podcast

Formed in a series of volcanic eruptions between 1 and 2 million years ago, the Jemez Mountains dominate the cultural and environmental history of central New Mexico.

For more than four decades, forest ecologist Craig Allen has studied them, engaging in what has come to be known as “place-based ecology,” with deep roots in what the Nuevo Mexicanos would call “querencia” – a deep love and sense of place.

The resulting of Craig’s passion is a vast body of scientific work that shed light on the impact of climate change on a forest landscape. The results also reflect a deeply personal journey for Allen, as aridity and fire change a place he loves.

Episode 4 of the Rin Tara/John Fleck Water Matters podcast

The 86-pound catfish of Lake San Marcial

Old newspaper headline: 86-Pound Catfish Hooked at San Marcial

Albuquerque Journal, June 17, 1951

If you have ever been to modern San Marcial, New Mexico – or what is left of it – the notion of an 86-pound catfish requires some explanation.

The spot where D.C. George hooked his record catfish is today ragged scrubland. But for a brief, shining, extremely odd period of time in the 1940s and ’50s, Lake San Marcial was a big deal.

It was popular with the hook and bullet set, while on occasion also swallowing Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe locomotives (so, less popular with the railroad).

It was the subject of dueling litigation. The railroad was mad about the swallowed locomotives, blaming the federal government for causing the lake. The Hunters, owners of the fishing resort, got mad when the federal government decided to drain (or maybe fill?) the lake, so they sued too.

It is a useful example of a common sequence of events when we engineer a river:

  1. Change a river with engineering.
  2. Something weird happens.
  3. People and ecosystems improvise, optimizing around the new state.
  4. But the new state causes problems, too.
  5. Try to fix these problems.
  6. People who had optimized around the new state, or who value the ecosystem’s optimization around the new state, are pissed about the change.

Located 120-ish river miles down the Rio Grande from Albuquerque, the town of San Marcial was a happening place in the early 1900s – major railroad employment center, heart of a what was, in the romantic retellings, a lovely little farming valley with its sibling Tiffany just up river and Val Verde across the narrow desert valley.

As the retellings often point out, it had an opera house. (I’m a writer. I get it. How can you resist an opera house.)

Upstream from a geomorphic bottleneck – the volcanic Black Mesa to the east, a string of sediment-laden arroyos coming in from the west – the San Marcial reach of the Rio Grande has long been a trouble spot for those bent on settling on the valley floor. Flooding was not uncommon. But with the 1916 completion of Elephant Butte Dam to the south, the flooding got worse. Elephant Butte’s full pool elevation is downstream of the bottleneck, but as a reservoir encroaching from downstream slows a river, sediment deposition creeps upstream, often well beyond the reservoir’s actual high water mark.

Whether Elephant Butte’s presence, the sediment deposition, actually caused the flooding that in 1929 ended San Marcial’s opera house days would be the subject of some legal debate in the decades that followed. A federal judge in 1960 ruled that the federal government, builder of Elephant Butte, was not to blame but, as I said, further research needed.

Base Level, Aggradation, and Grade

The modern scientific consensus seems to be that, duh, of course Elephant Butte caused the demise of San Marcial.

Perhaps the most notable example of the aggrading wedge upstream of a reservoir is at the Elephant Butte reservoir, built in 1912 on the Rio Grande about 300 km downstream of Albuquerque, New Mexico (Eakin, 1936). By the 1930s, the Rio Grande had aggraded many kilometers upstream of the head of the lake. Because the sediment load was sand, most of the aggradation was in the channel with the creation of natural levees. Drainage from the distal land on to the floodplain was blocked from entering the stream by the natural levees and thus the floodplain became a wetland and was even ponded in many places. Near the reservoir, the stream level was superposed, or higher than the floodplain. By the 1930s, a local village, San Marcial, began to be flooded and was finally evacuated (Eakin, 1936). It was feared that the wedge of sediment would eventually extend all the way to Albuquerque but that never happened (Mackin, 1948).

– Trimble, Stanley W. “Streams, valleys and floodplains in the sediment cascade.” Sediment cascades: An integrated approach (2010): 307-343.

Graph showing sediment wedge puling up behind Ramah dam.

Sediment Wedge, Ramah, New Mexico.

In their seminal paper Base Level, Aggradation, and Grade, Luna Leopold and William Bull explained how a river slows and drops is sediments as it reaches a controlling base level. The most obvious example is the ocean, which on geomorphological time scales is relatively stable. The result is a wedge of sediment well upstream of the ocean itself. This also happens when we dam a river. The reservoir level acts like a mini-ocean, and the sediments back up well upstream of the of the reservoir level itself as water slows down and spreads out.

Natural constraints do this as well – constraints like the pinch point between the volcanic mesa to the east and arroyos dumping in their load from the west just downstream from the ill-fated community of San Marcial.

A tale of catfish and willow flycatchers

Topographic map showing Lake San Marcial and its surrounding area in New Mexico. The Rio Grande flows from the northeast to the southwest through the center of the map, bordered by wide green floodplain areas indicating riparian vegetation. Lake San Marcial appears as a large blue water body on the west bank of the Rio Grande, just south of the town of San Marcial. A railroad labeled “Atchison” runs parallel to the river’s west bank, passing between San Marcial and Lake San Marcial, and continuing south past Val Verde. The map also shows ruins, cemeteries, and geographic features like Mesa Peak and the Pedro Armendaris Grant boundary.

San Marcial Lake

The weird thing for today’s blog post is the lake, which seems to have emerged in the 1940s, perhaps following the floods of 1941 and ’42, which pushed Elephant Butte to its high stand, depositing sediment in this reach and in general causing a geomorphologic mess – not a mess for the river, the river’s just doin’ river stuff, but a mess for the humans who had taken on the obligation of managing the Rio Grande.

Like, trains kept falling into Lake San Marcial, but more importantly for the task of river management, water that humans wanted to hurry on down to Elephant Butte so folks downstream could water their crops was instead spreading out in the “lake” and surrounding swamps. The river no longer flowed here, and New Mexico as a result had fallen hundreds of thousands of acre feet behind in its obligations under the Rio Grande Compact to deliver water to Elephant Butte Reservoir for use in Southern New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico.

Draining the lake and those swamps was as a result a passionate imperative among New Mexicans in the 1950s, as we essentially agreed to federalize the river so the taxpayers of the nation, after helping create the problem by subsidizing Elephant Butte Dam for our benefit, were now asked to again subsidize the fix to the problem created at Elephant Butte’s upstream end.

The Middle Rio Grande Project

The Flood Control Act of 1948 (and a subsequent 1950 iteration) authorized the US Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers to, among other things, “fix” the San Marcial stretch of the Rio Grande- “river rectification” was the formal terminology of the day. To do that, the Bureau dug what amounts to a second river channel, which today we call the “Low Flow Conveyance Channel,” alongside the river’s old channel. Here’s the explanation from Chris Gorbach’s 1999 history (found in these conference proceedings):

In 1951, President Truman gave Reclamation special authority to start channel construction immediately. Work on the low-flow channel and clearing a floodway for passage of higher flows began in October of that year. Construction on the low-flow channel continued throughout the ’50s. A first phase, the so-called San Marcial Channel, was completed at the end of 1953. Diversions through a heading near the southern end of the Bosque del Apache began in November of that year. Extension of the low-low channel upstream to San Acacia was completed in 1959. When completed, the low-flow channel extended some 70 miles from San Acacia to a point just above the narrows of Elephant Butte Reservoir.

By 1956, the lake where D.C. George hooked that 86-pounder was dried up, turned to grazing land for cattle, and the Hunters were suing the federal government over the loss of their fishing resort. Further research needed on the demise of San Marcial Lake. The news coverage of the day suggests the Bureau of Reclamation diverted silt-laden Rio Grande water into the lake to fill it up. The Hunters called that negligence, the Bureau responded that, no, it was exactly what they intended, and were authorized by Congress to do.

Laguna de Fray Cristóbal

Three quarters of a century after the demise of San Marcial Lake, we’re experiencing a repeat. About ten miles downstream, a large body of water has emerged, apparently of some interest to anglers, certainly of great interest to Southwestern Willow Flycatchers (ecosystems improvise, optimizing around the new state), and also certainly of extraordinary interest to the water managers of 2025 charged with carrying out the obligations we took on as a community when we began engineering the Rio Grande more than a century ago.

Off to the west of the end of the Low Flow Conveyance Channel are 100 acres of open water surrounded by wetlands that are, from a “water in the desert” environmental aesthetic perspective, a delight created by leaks and levee failures in a stretch of the river that doesn’t get a lot of love. The Bureau of Reclamation has even installed gizmos to divert some of the water now flowing down the Low Flow Conveyance Channel into this wetland, beloved by the endangered flycatcher. But in a world in which competing and conflicting values include a desire to move water to farms and cities downstream, in the process meeting the legal requirements of the Rio Grande Compact, the River Mile 60 pond is not universally beloved. Here’s Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District CEO/Chief Engineer Jason Casuga in a letter to the state last summer:

What was originally a failure in infrastructure has now become a managed habitat feature by the federal government. The breach channel eventually makes its way back to the river some 7 miles downstream of RM 60. MRGCD is concerned about the depletions taking place within the breach channel and adjacent floodplain habitat when you consider the area of inundation is likely between 900 to 1,500 acres and has a corresponding evapotranspiration rate of more than 5.5’ per acre annually (based on OpenET).

At a time New Mexico is falling farther and farther behind on its compact obligation to communities in Southern New Mexico and Texas, this is a problem. It is an example of the sometimes competing and conflicting values at play when we take on the enduring obligation of engineering a river.

In a letter last week (July 17, 2025) to the Bureau of Reclamation, New Mexico Office of the State Engineer General Counsel Nat Chakeres gently suggested that diverting water into the wetland was not in keeping with the aforementioned Flood Control Acts of 1948 and ’50, which authorized Reclamation to bail us out of the messes that Reclamation in part created by building Elephant Butte in the first place. Chakeres’ argument is that the acts of Congress setting the whole thing up explicitly prioritized delivery of Compact water.

In summary, the sole authorized purpose of the LFCC is to convey water to Elephant Butte for compliance with the Rio Grande Compact. If water is diverted from the LFCC and consumed for habitat purposes, that is water that could have been delivered but was not.

There’s been some discussion about what we should call the River Mile 60 pond. A number of names have been suggested, but none capture the grace of this much-maligned, often forgotten but, to my eyes, magnificent stretch of the Rio Grande.

Nearby is the old Paraje de Fray Cristóbal, a hardscrabble stopping point on the old Camino Real. I suggest we call it “Laguna de Fray Cristóbal.”

Quoting Bonnie Colby

University of Arizona economist Bonnie Colby on why the enduring opposition to water transfers out of agriculture goes beyond price:

This is not surprising given third party economic effects when irrigated agriculture diminishes in a region. However, the enduring nature of the opposition is striking, even when seemingly generous compensation is included for third party effects. The opposition is about something beyond money changing hands and the workings of regional economies. Individual property rights in water that can transfer to other uses at the discretion of the water right owner clash with a cultural sense of water as an eco-social and community asset passed down across generations.

Colby, Bonnie. “Acquiring environmental flows: ecological economics of policy development in western US.” Ecological Economics 173 (2020): 106655.

Such a rich paper! Here’s another favorite bit:

In the western U.S., water is a key part of identity for indigenous tribes and rural farming communities. These parties articulate clearly that water is central to their collective identity, in addition to its economic importance (Colby et al., 2005; Deol and Colby, 2018). Water also contributes to identity for city dwellers, recreationists and environmental advocates. Some western U.S. cities are known for lush landscaping, golf courses and fountains, despite their arid climate. Those who enjoy kayaking and fishing have a sense of collective identity and form groups to argue for more water dedicated to these pursuits. Environmental and conservation organizations build identities, reputations and fund-raising campaigns based on their successes in restoring flows to rivers and wetlands. Where identity is tied to water, water trading encounters complexities beyond the norm for real estate transactions.

(Fall class for UNM Water Resources and Econ grad students starts in a few weeks, going back over favorite readings to prepare.)

 

Return of the Deadpool Diaries: The Colorado River news keeps getting worse

abandoned boat at Lake Mead

“That boat is totally fixable.” – Greg

With the latest Bureau of Reclamation model runs highlighting the serious risks posed by the declining reservoir levels that Utah State’s Jack Schmidt has been warning about, there are signs that the closed-room discussions among the seven basin states, after brief glimmers of hope last month, are once again not going well.

The Reservoirs

The latest Bureau of Reclamation 24-month studies show a clear risk of Lake Powell dropping below minimum power pool in late 2026, with Lake Mead dropping to elevation 1,025 by the summer of 2027. This should be hair on fire stuff.

The “clear risk” here is based on Reclamation’s monthly “minimum probable” model runs – what happens if we have bad snowpacks next year, and the year after? These are probabilistic estimates, not predictions. But the whole point of Reclamation doing this is so that we can be prepared. We need a robust public discussion about what our plan is if we end up on this fork in the hydrologic road.

The warning signs are clearly there in Jack’s analyses. Frustrated by the delay in the traditional metrics we use for measuring and monitoring the Colorado River, Jack’s been doing routine updates on reservoir storage contents. The traditional metrics we use – the Upper Basin Consumptive Uses and Losses Reports, the Lower Basin Decree Accounting Reports, the Natural Flow Database – have significant lags. The reservoir data is there in real time, integrating how much the climate system provides and how much humans use. The data here are all public. Jack’s value add is to sum them up and slice and dice the resulting data structures.

The somewhat arcane but incredibly useful framework he’s been using his his recent analyses is the period of accumulation, when reservoirs rise as river flows exceed human uses above them and extractions below them, following by the period of decline, when we’re drawing down the reservoirs. This is a tool, or a way of thinking, that we could use in real time to adjust our behavior, noting bad reservoir conditions and reducing our use. This is not something our water allocation framework is well suited to do.

The Negotiations

For more than a year, those involved in the delicate interstate negotiations over future Colorado River water allocation rules have repeatedly asked that we give them space to have the hard conversations they need to have in private. The results, or lack thereof, have done nothing to earn our trust.

When Arizona’s Tom Buschatzke moved the up-until-then super secret “supply driven” allocation concept into public view a month ago, it seemed like a good sign along two dimensions. First, the idea of basing the amount of water delivered from Upper Basin to Lower Basin past Lee Ferry on actual hydrology, on a percentage of how much water the climate is actually providing, seemed like an eminently reasonable approach. Second, Buschatzke was talking about this in public.

Folks from the Upper Basin followed suit, and a round of positive press followed.

Talking to Alex Hager, I called it “a glimmer of hope.”

But as this shifts from the brief sunshine of public statements back to the closed door negotiations, any glimmer appears dim indeed.

The problems were already visible in that brief, glorious bit of sunshine of public discussion last month.

There are two critical questions that need to be settled to make this work. The obvious one is the number – what percentage of the three year natural flow are we talking about shepherding down past Lee Ferry? The second is more subtle: What happens if the Lee Ferry flow falls short of that number?

Speaking to the Arizona Reconsultation Committee, Buschatzke was clear that whatever percentage number they settled on would be an Upper Basin “delivery obligation” at Lee Ferry. Becky Mitchell, speaking on behalf of Colorado, (but effectively as the de-facto Upper Basin voice, the role the other Upper Basin states seem to have for all practical purposes ceded to her) said (per Heather Sackett’s excellent reporting) it was in no way to be considered a delivery obligation.

When I suggested in a blog post that Upper Basin states might need to curtail water users in order to ensure the agreed-upon-percentage (whatever that is) is met, I got an angry call informing me that the Upper Basin was considering no such thing.

What this makes clear is that the same disagreement over the irreducibly ambiguous legal question in Article III of the Colorado River Compact – does the Upper Basin have a Lee Ferry delivery obligation or not? – is simply being shifted to a new modeling framework.

Never mind the equally intractable question of what the Lee Ferry don’t-call-it-a-delivery-obligation percentage might be. I don’t know anything more than gossip, but the gossip suggests the attempt to settle on a number, or even a range of numbers that Reclamation might model as part of its NEPA analysis, also is not going well.

If I was talking to Alex Hager today, I would no longer describe a glimmer of hope.

The Failure Mode

One of the most useful questions I learned to ask as a reporter covering water involved drilling down to the question of what happens when scarcity finally bites. What is the failure mode? Who actually doesn’t get water? How does that work?

The combination of Jack’s analysis and Reclamation’s latest 24-month study suggests that we need to be asking that question in the near term. When Powell approaches minimum power pool, and Mead drops below 1030, whose water use will be curtailed to protect the system? If your answer involves a defense of why your own water supply should not be reduced, you’re doing this wrong. Everyone needs to be realistic about their risk of a legal outcome different from their agency lawyer’s position. But we also need to recognize moral obligations here, to find ways to share in this shrinking river. How are we going to come together, as a community, to respond?

The longer term argument also needs to begin to take this form.

Let us imagine going to the Supreme Court to settle the question of whether the Upper Basin does or does not have a legal delivery obligation under Article III of the Colorado River Compact to deliver 75 million or 82.5 million acre feet per year past Lee Ferry. If you lose that litigation, what is the failure mode? Who actually doesn’t get water? If your groupthink has convinced you that this is not a meaningful question, that you’re sure to win, and the other basin is the one that needs to be thinking about failure modes, you need a second opinion, to get out of your groupthink bubble.

Whatever “bring it on” enthusiasm for litigation you’re hearing from your groupthinkers needs to be tempered by an honest discussion about what happens to your communities’ water supplies if you lose.

I’ll also make a modest pitch here for a need to recognize moral obligations, to find ways to share this shrinking river.